`pdfGetConformanceViolation`

Read back the real violation list pdfCheckConformance's

int32_t __stdcall pdfGetConformanceViolationCount(PPDF IPDF);
BOOL32 __stdcall pdfGetConformanceViolationA(PPDF IPDF, int32_t Index, int32_t* Code, const char* Buf, int32_t BufLen);

Delphi

function pdfGetConformanceViolationCount(const IPDF: PPDF): Integer; stdcall;
function pdfGetConformanceViolationA(const IPDF: PPDF; Index: Integer; out Code: Integer; Buf: PAnsiChar; BufLen: Integer): LongBool; stdcall;

Purpose. Read back the real violation list pdfCheckConformance's import-side validator populated — one (Code, human-readable message) pair per violation found.

Description. Both are plain, real accessors over the same FConfVCodes/FConfVMsgs parallel arrays populated by CheckImportConformance — there is no separate "run the check" step here; these simply read whatever the most recent pdfCheckConformance call recorded. pdfGetConformanceViolationA's Buf output is bounded by BufLen (truncated and always null-terminated, standard fixed-buffer-safe string-copy convention used elsewhere in this SDK).

Parameters.

Parameter	Description
`IPDF`	Document handle.
`Index`	`0`-based index into the violation list from the most recent `pdfCheckConformance` call.
`Code`	Output: the violation's numeric code (e.g. `1` = forbidden encryption, `2` = missing XMP metadata — see `pdfCheckConformance` for the confirmed code list).
`Buf`, `BufLen`	Output: the human-readable violation message, truncated to fit and always null-terminated.

Return value. pdfGetConformanceViolationCount: the number of violations recorded by the most recent check. pdfGetConformanceViolationA: True if Index is in range.

C# (P/Invoke)

wrappers/dotnet/LumasPdf.cs

[return: MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.Bool)]

Area

PDF/A & Conformance